No empirical evidence has yet emerged for the existence of a robust positive relationship between financial openness and economic growth. This paper argues that a key reason for the elusive evidence is the presence of a non-linear relationship between openness and growth over time: countries tend to gain in the short-term, immediately following capital account liberalization, but may not grow faster or even experience temporary growth reversals in the medium-to long-term. The paper finds substantial empirical evidence for the existence of such an intertemporal trade-off for 45 industrialized and emerging market economies. The acceleration of growth immediately after liberalization is found to be often driven by an investment boom and a surge in portfolio and debt inflows. By contrast, the quality of domestic institutions, the size of FDI inflows and the sequencing of the liberalization process are found to be important driving forces for growth in the medium to longer term. The central hypothesis of the paper is that a key reason for the elusive evidence of a robust openness-growth nexus is the presence of a non-linear relationship between openness and growth over time. This implies that there may be an intertemporal trade-off in that countries tend to gain in the short-term, immediately following capital account liberalization, but may not grow faster or even experience temporary growth reversals in the medium-to long-term.
Non-technical summary
The financial crises of the 1990s rekindled the debate on the benefits of financial liberalization. Economic theory is ambiguous about the relationship between financial openness and economic growth. Models based on the paradigm of competitive and efficient markets tell us that financial openness should foster economic growth and development by improving the allocation of capital. By contrast, others have stressed that the presence of market distortions may lead to welfare reducing effects of financial liberalization. Such market distortions can take various forms, such as asymmetric information and hidden action (e.g. Stiglitz 1998), or be related to political economy factors (e.g. Bhagwati 1998 ).
Despite significant research efforts in recent years, the empirical literature is still very much divided on whether financial liberalization benefits economies, and if so what the necessary prerequisites and conditions are. While some countries have benefited from financial liberalization, others have not enjoyed higher economic growth or have even experienced severe crises and recessions in the years following liberalization.
The central hypothesis of the paper is that a key reason for the elusive evidence of a robust openness-growth nexus is the presence of a non-linear relationship between openness and growth over time. This implies that there may be an intertemporal trade-off in that countries tend to gain in the short-term, immediately following capital account liberalization, but may not grow faster or even experience temporary growth reversals in the medium-to long-term.
The objective and intended contribution of the paper are to test for such an intertemporal trade-off empirically for a broad set of 45 developing and developed economies. Using a standard growth model, the paper starts by comparing open and closed economies and confirms much of the literature's results that open economies indeed do not grow more rapidly than closed ones. Looking at a broad set of potential explanatory factors, it is found that it is in particular the quality of domestic political institutions that play a key role in explaining why some countries benefit from liberalization whereas others with weaker institutions experience lower growth.
The paper then takes a different angle from the literature and to test for the presence of a nonlinear relationship between openness and growth over time. The paper distinguishes between the initial, short-run reaction and the medium-to long-run response of economies to financial liberalization. It presents evidence that economies indeed tend to receive an initial boost and
Introduction
Although economic theory, based on models of competitive and efficient markets, tells us that financial openness should foster economic growth and development, empirical work so far has not found convincing evidence for the existence of such a link. While some countries have benefited from financial liberalization, others have not enjoyed higher economic growth or have even experienced severe crises and recessions in the years following liberalization.
The counter-argument to those underlining the benefits of liberalization based on the efficient-market paradigm has been to stress the presence of market distortions that may lead to welfare reducing effects of financial liberalization. Such market distortions can take various forms, such as asymmetric information and hidden action (e.g. Stiglitz 1998), or be related to political economy factors (e.g. Bhagwati 1998 ).
Some recent theoretical work has argued that the main benefits from liberalization may not come from having access to external capital, but primarily from the fact that the process of opening up leads to a reduction of domestic distortions and locks in economic reforms (Gourinchas and Jeanne 2002) . The recent empirical literature on the issue has investigated a broad set of potential factors and distortions, such as the role of financial depth and development, the quality of domestic institutions, the sequencing of reforms, and the composition of capital inflows. Despite this effort, however, remarkably little consensus has so far been reached about the underlying forces that make financial liberalization raise economic growth. 1 This lack of evidence in favor of a robust openness-growth nexus is puzzling in several regards. In particular, an important caveat is that today's most developed economies all have open capital accounts 2 and liberalized domestic financial sectors. Moreover, those developing and transition countries that have opened up, did so relatively recently, mostly between the late 1980s and the mid-1990s. The key question therefore does not seem to be whether countries benefit from liberalization in the (very) long-run, but the timing and the circumstances under which they benefit.
A key hypothesis that has received little attention in the empirical literature is that there is a trade-off over time between openness and growth. The theoretical work by Gourinchas and Jeanne (2002) implies that financial liberalization yields only a one-off benefit for economies 1 See Edison et al. (2002a) and Eichengreen (2002) for recent surveys of the literature.
in the short-term, which subsequently return to their long-term growth path. Pill (1997, 1999) argue that, in the short-run, improved access to foreign capital may lead to "overborrowing", i.e. an investment boom, and thus temporarily higher growth. However, this initial bubble may be followed by a severe bust, financial crisis and economic contraction as the boom becomes unsustainable. 3 Hence countries opening up their financial markets may experience a boom and higher growth in the short-run, followed by a recession and a temporary "bust" in the medium-term, and may reap the full gain from liberalization only in the very long-run. Both of the theoretical arguments by Gourinchas and Jeanne (2002) and Pill (1997, 1999) therefore imply a short-run gain and either no gain or a medium-to long-run pain from financial liberalization.
The objective of the paper is to test for such an intertemporal trade-off empirically for a broad set of 45 developing and developed economies. The paper distinguishes between the initial, short-run reaction and the medium-to long-run response of economies to financial liberalization. It presents evidence that economies indeed tend to receive an initial boost and grow faster in the initial five years following financial liberalization. However, after this short-run gain, economies tend to grow more slowly in the subsequent years. This suggests that there is indeed a trade-off over time, i.e. a short-run gain and a medium/long-run "pain".
Given that most emerging markets liberalized only within the last decade, an important caveat is, however, that this cost in the medium-term may be only be a temporary one, and that countries may return to faster growth in the long-run, following the experience of most developed economies decades earlier. It therefore may be too early to tell whether developing countries will really gain in the long-run from liberalization.
The literature has so far given little attention to this potential intertemporal trade-off. Kaminsky and Schmukler (2003) look at a similar trade-off, though not for economic growth but for equity markets. They find that the amplitude of boom-bust cycles in equity markets is higher in the initial period after liberalization, and that it falls subsequently. In the literature on openness and growth, the work that analyses a related issue is that of Eichengreen and Leblang (2003) . They argue that the reason for the lack of evidence for a positive relationship between openness and growth in the literature is its failure to account for financial crises.
They indeed find that countries grow faster when controlling for crises. However, the difficulty with this argument is one of endogeneity, i.e. that countries may be experiencing
2 Note that what the paper calls "capital account" is in fact the financial account according to the IMF's 5 th Balance of Payments Manual. However, the paper sticks to the commonly used terminology. 3 In Pill (1997, 1999) , it is moral hazard that induces excessive investment and risktaking as investors are insufficiently supervised and expect to be bailed out if investment projects fail.
severe crises because they have liberalized. Hence, as in the McKinnon-Pill argument, the initial boom in growth may come at the cost of lower growth or recession later on.
Looking at the wider literature on openness and growth, Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti (1995) were among the first who pointed out the lack of a positive effect of capital account liberalizationproxied by the removal of restrictions to capital account transactions as published in the IMF's Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAR) -on growth for 61 countries between 1966 and 1989 . Rodrik (1998 also fails to find a positive opennessgrowth nexus for close to 100 countries, using a similar openness measure, although his approach is a purely cross-sectional one in which he analyzes whether countries that had been open for a relatively longer part of the period 1975-89 also experienced faster economic growth. The findings of these two influential studies stand in sharp contrast to those of Quinn (1997) , who develops an original measure of openness, also based on AREAR but allowing for different degrees of openness. He finds that the change in his openness measure is indeed significant in explaining faster real GDP growth for a set of 58 countries in 1960-89.
After the sharp contrast of these findings, most of the recent papers have essentially attempted to verify the robustness of the results using different country samples, openness measures, time periods and empirical methodologies. Eichengreen (2002) points out that a large part of the different results may come from the fact that Quinn's sample includes more industrialized countries and relatively fewer observations of the lost decade of the 1980s. Edwards (2001) , Bailliu (2000) and Klein and Olivei (1999) indeed find evidence that openness promotes growth in industrialized countries, although Edwards' (2001) results also reveal that openness tends to hurt growth in developing countries. Arteta, Eichengreen and Wyplosz (2001) , by contrast, argue that Edwards' results are sensitive to several exogeneity assumptions and the choice of the empirical methodology. Moreover, they find some positive effect of openness on growth only if countries have stable macroeconomic conditions. Edison et al. (2002b) also do not detect any strong empirical link between openness and growth although they use a broad variety of different openness measures -both based on the AREAR and on de facto measures of openness -for a broad set of countries and using three different methodologies, two cross-sectional ones based on OLS and IV and one based on a dynamic panel data model using GMM. Finally, Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad (2001) analyze a different type of openness by looking at the effects of stock market liberalization on growth in a panel framework. They find that equity market liberalization leads to a 1% increase in annual GDP growth during the five years after liberalization.
The intended contribution of this paper is to take a different angle from the literature and to test for the presence of a non-linear relationship between openness and growth over time, i.e. the presence of an intertemporal trade-off between growth and financial liberalization. Using a standard growth model, the paper starts by comparing open and closed economies and confirms much of the literature's results that open economies indeed do not grow more rapidly than closed ones. Looking at a broad set of potential explanatory factors, it is found that it is in particular the quality of domestic political institutions that play a key role in explaining why some countries benefit from liberalization whereas others with weaker institutions experience lower growth.
Analyzing the intertemporal trade-off, it is found that countries indeed tend to grow more quickly immediately after liberalization and slower in the medium-term. More specifically, countries that gain in the initial five-year period after liberalization are those that experience an investment boom, have large portfolio investment and debt inflows and have larger current account deficits. These findings provide support of the McKinnon-Pill hypothesis of the presence of an "overborrowing syndrome" after liberalization. Moreover, it is found that what promotes growth in the medium-to long-term are the quality of institutions as well as the composition of capital inflows. Overall, therefore, the findings imply that the quality of institutions as well as the size and composition of capital inflows are two key determinants for why some countries benefit from financial liberalization in the medium-to long-run.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines some key conceptual and data issues. The section includes a discussion of alternative openness measures used in the literature, and in this paper, for quantifying financial openness. Moreover, the country sample, data and variable definitions and the empirical methodology are discussed. Section 3 then presents the As an alternative, Quinn (1997) exploits the details of the descriptions in the AREAR to construct an openness measures which can take 9 different degrees of openness -from 0 to 4 in 0.5 point increments. This allows for a much finer categorization of de jure openness and its changes. However, a key drawbacks is that this openness measure has been created only for four years -1958, 1973, 1982 and 1988 - thus not allowing the identification of in which years a country undertook those changes.
As an alternative to these de jure measures, the literature has analyzed various de facto proxies of openness. The rationale for looking at actual openness is that a country that is open de jure may not necessarily attract capital inflows or experience such outflows. Since the question of interest is whether capital flows benefit or hurt countries, one may argue that one should define openness in terms of both legal restrictions and actual capital flows. The literature has looked at various capital flows as related to FDI, portfolio flows and debt flows (e.g. Kraay 1998) .
Moreover, what may matter for whether countries grow faster or slower may not be the flows per se, but the stock (cumulated flows) of foreign capital into the countries. Some work therefore builds on the pioneering work by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001) and employs net foreign asset positions to capture a country's capital stock (e.g. Edison et al. 2002b ). However, apart from the measurement difficulties, one problem with using actual capital flow or stock data is that there may be a non-linear relationship between the magnitude of capital flows and economic performance: countries may benefit from modest inflows, but may not do so if capital inflows become very large, and they may gain if they take some forms, such as FDI, rather than others.
One key difficulty of analyzing the link between financial openness and growth is that the opening process may not be purely exogenous, or at least may be correlated with other developments in the economy. This problem may be particularly acute for the de facto openness measures because actual capital inflows are likely to at least in part be the response of investors to such factors as investment opportunities, the economic and political environment etc. This potential problem should be less serious for the de jure measure as this refers to a usually one-off decision to abolish legal restrictions. 
Data and definitions
The paper analyzes the openness-growth nexus for a set of 45 developed and developing that are already open, but to some extent also by data availability.
5 In a few cases, such as in Latin America in the early 1980s and Malaysia temporarily in 1998-99, governments decided to reverse the liberalization and close their capital account. However, these cases are rare, as shown by Olivei and Klein (1999) . 6 Malta is not included due to data availability.
For the de jure measure of capital account openness, the paper mostly uses the data from Kaminsky and Schmukler (2003) . The Kaminsky-Schmukler dataset allows distinguishing between three degrees of openness, i.e. between "partially liberalized", "fully liberalized" and closed regimes. Moreover, they create similar measures for the openness of domestic equity markets and domestic financial markets for 28 countries for the period 1973-99. Most of their data is based on the IMF's AREAR. What is missing from their dataset, however, are in particular the acceding countries. This paper adds these countries by using information from the EBRD's annual transition reports. Due to the transition process from communist systems, these countries are included only starting in the early to mid-1990s.
For the de facto openness measures, following Edison et al. (2002b) and Kraay (1998) In order to check for the relevance of the quality of institutions, the paper utilizes the rich database of International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) on various political country characteristics, in particular on the quality of the bureaucracy, corruption, democratic 
Empirical methodology
The starting point of the empirical modeling is a simple growth model that is standard in the literature (e.g. Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1995) . The dependent variable is the growth rate of real per capita GDP. The control variables are the log of real per capita income at the beginning of the period, the investment to GDP ratio, the log of secondary school enrolment at the beginning of the period, the population growth rate, as well as government expenditure as a ratio of GDP. The paper follows the modeling strategy of the great majority of studies in the literature and uses this model as its benchmark. Subsequently, other variables of interest and interaction terms are added to the benchmark model, so that the variables of the benchmark model stay in the model but are supplemented by other variables of interest.
The paper employs a dynamic panel-data approach, using 5-year averages or changes of the variables. This allows us to exploit both the within and the between information of the data while reducing the drawback of having strong cyclical factors in the data. A number of papers in the literature use the same or a very similar approach (e.g. Edison et al. 2002b , Eichengreen and Leblang 2003 , Bekaert et al. 2001 ). This transformation entails that for the 45 countries mostly five 5-year periods exist (1980-84, 1985-89, 1990-94, 1995-99, 2000-02) , though acceding countries are only included starting in the 1990s. The openness measure is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if a country's capital account was open for the majority of the 5-year period and zero otherwise. Several sensitivity checks have been conducted, and
showed that the results were robust to altering the specification by e.g. including instead the share of the years a country was open during a period.
As to the estimation technique, one option is to use a fixed-effects estimator which allows for country fixed effects. The autocorrelation and persistence in the data, however, requires a dynamic estimation of the model. The problem with the fixed-effects estimator is that the dynamic transformation is likely to introduce an inconsistency of the estimator for models with few time series observations and a large(r) number of cross-sectional observations (see Nickell 1981) . This is likely to be the case for this model since T=5 and N=45.
The estimation technique used instead is the GMM estimator introduced by Arellano and Bond (1991) . This GMM estimator is a dynamic one that estimates the model in first differences and uses lagged values of the variables as instruments. Starting from the standard specification in levels, where the real per capita growth rate y i,t is persistent, i.e. it is a function of its own past values, and it is related to a set of independent variables X i,t , which are assumed to be weakly exogenous, and a country fixed effect µ i
and, after taking first differences, yields:
One result of the transformation is that all variables that are time-invariant, such as the country fixed effects, drop out from the model. A key problem with the model of equation (2) is the potential endogeneity of the control variables as well as the correlation between the lagged dependent variable y i,t-1 and the error term ?e i,t . The basic idea is to solve this issue by using higher-order lags of y i,t-1 as instruments for y i,t-1 . For the GMM estimator to yield unbiased and consistent estimators requires the validity of the moment conditions A first interesting stylized fact is that real per capita GDP growth in the sample of 45 countries indeed increased immediately following liberalization -indicated by period t=0 in the figures -but then falls back roughly to its pre-liberalization levels thereafter. Second, the investment to GDP ratio undergoes a similar trend as the growth rate. Third, for the capital flow variables, portfolio inflows and short-term debt inflows seem to accelerate relatively quickly after liberalization. By contrast, FDI inflows rise more gradually over time.
Fourth, in terms of liberalization of domestic equity markets and financial markets -a point related to the sequencing of reforms analyzed in more detail in section 3.5 below -an important stylized fact is that about 40% of the countries had liberalized either their domestic financial markets, their domestic equity markets or both prior to opening up their capital account. 8 The other countries liberalized these markets either roughly simultaneously or later than the capital account. Finally, the ICRG total composite index and the political risk index improve significantly in the years before and after liberalization.
9
A final noteworthy point is that the divergence of the variables -shown by the standard deviations in the figures -is not only relatively large, but mostly increases significantly after liberalization. This rise is particularly strong for the capital flow variables. Overall, these stylized facts shows some interesting results. But they also underline that despite some marked differences between the pre-liberalization and post-liberalization periods, as well as between the short-term versus long-term post-liberalization periods, one cannot readily draw a clear-cut conclusion about the link between openness and growth. The aim of the econometric analysis is to carefully disentangle these effects.
8 The y-axis shows the percentage share of all countries that had liberalized at any one point in time. 9 Note that a higher measure for the institutional variables implies an improvement in institutions. 
Openness and growth: is there a relationship?
As a first step of the econometric analysis, this section repeats the analysis typically done in the literature by testing whether open economies per se grow faster than closed ones. The benchmark model is therefore Consistent with much of the literature, no significant relationship between openness and growth is found (model (1)). However, there is a strong positive and significant link between openness and growth when controlling for financial crises. Financial crises are defined mostly as large devaluations of domestic currency, following the methodology used in Bussiere and Fratzscher (2002) . In other words, financial openness is conducive to growth if one controls for crises.
This finding is very much in line with those by Eichengreen and Leblang (2003) . However, the problem with interpreting these results is that the occurrence of financial crises can clearly not be assumed to be exogenous to financial liberalization. Leblang (2001) and Bordo, Eichengreen, Klingenbiel and Martinez Peria (2001) show that financial crises are more frequent among closed economies. However, the results found here as well as in Eichengreen and Leblang (2003) imply that financial crises tend to be more severe in open economies in terms of lost growth.
Table 1: Effects of liberalization on growth: Benchmark results
Distinguishing between the effects of financial liberalization on short-term versus long-term growth, as in equation (5), reveals that economies tend to grow significantly faster in the immediate five years after liberalization -both with and without controlling for crises (models (4) and (5)). By contrast, growth after these initial five-year period is not significantly different compared to other periods. Table 2 shows the extension of the model presented in equation (4) In summary, the findings presented in the subsection are important ones because they underline that in order to understand the link between financial openness and growth, researchers need to look not only at country-specific characteristics relevant for growth, but also at the time dynamics of the liberalization process.
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where openness is now interacted with the macroeconomic or institutional variable X i,t . The first column in Table 3 shows the effect ? of the variables when a country is closed, and the second column the effect (?+?) when a country is open. The third column indicates whether the difference between both effects is significant, i.e. whether a particular factor has a statistically stronger effect on growth when a country is open as opposed to when it is closed.
Table 3: Interaction of openness and macroeconomic variables
The results confirm that financial crises are more severe in terms of a loss in growth when economies are open financially. An open economy suffering a financial crisis grows, on average, 8% less over the corresponding five-year period compared to non-crisis countries.
By contrast, the loss in growth is only 6% for countries that are closed and experience a crisis.
Moreover, a further interesting finding is that quality of institutions seem to be significantly more important for open economies than for closed ones in order to raise the rate of economic institutions in an open economy, but this gain is also significantly larger than that for closed economies.
As to the macroeconomic variables, it is found that the total debt and short-term debt ratios hurt growth only in open economies, confirming the importance of the external debt variables already indicated in Table 2 .
The intertemporal trade-off: Short-run gain versus long-run pain?
I now turn to the question of why there is an intertemporal trade-off between openness and growth. Table 1 showed that economies tend to grow significantly faster in the initial period after liberalization, while they seem to not gain in the medium-to long-term. Why is this the case? In particular, do some variables spur growth in the short-run, but inhibit growth in the long-run?
To address these questions, the following model is estimated:
which is based on the same idea as equation (6) Tables 4 and 5 show the empirical findings.
As to the macroeconomic controls, a first important result is that poorer economies -proxied by the initial income per capita -gain more from financial liberalization than richer ones, and in particular in the immediate aftermath of liberalization. This finding supports the argument by Gourinchas and Jeanne (2002) that liberalization tends to provide a one-off gain to economies in the short-run. Second, investment is positively related to growth only in the years immediately after liberalization, but not significantly related to growth in the mediumto long-term.
A third important finding is related to the de facto openness measures. Portfolio investment inflows are found to raise growth substantially in the short-run, but not in the long-run. By contrast, countries tend to benefit from FDI inflows only in the medium-to long-run but not in the short-run after liberalization. The effect of portfolio investment on growth is much stronger than the effect of FDI, which is shown by the size and significance of the coefficient of combined portfolio and FDI inflows in the short-term post liberalization period.
Taking the second and third findings together provides substantial support for the McKinnonPill argument of the "overborrowing" syndrome inherent in the liberalization process. The results suggest that there is indeed a strong intertemporal trade-off from liberalization in that a boom in investment and portfolio inflows raises growth immediately after liberalization, but provides no benefits in the medium to long-run. In fact, the coefficients for both variables are negative, though not statistically significant, in the long-run. This indeed suggest the presence of a boom-bust cycle due to liberalization, as suggested by the theoretical models by Pill (1997, 1999) . 
Sensitivity analysis
As the final step of the analysis, several sensitivity and robustness tests of the results are conducted. We focus in particular on three issues: the definition and different types of financial openness, differences across countries and regions, and the role of financial crises.
Turning to the first of these issues -the definition of openness -sections 3.1 to 3. We conduct a similar analysis for the openness-growth nexus by using the KaminskySchmukler data on the openness of domestic financial sectors and equity markets, and again complement their dataset with EBRD information for acceding countries. We estimate the following model
which is basically the same model as equation (4) (1) (2) without crisis control with crisis control Table 6 shows the results for two sets of countries: first, all countries, and second, only emerging market economies. We also compare the result with versus without controlling for financial crises (models (1) and (2)). The key result is that there are large differences between countries depending on the sequencing of the liberalization process. Countries that liberalize their domestic financial sectors first experience significantly higher growth after liberalization. Countries that liberalize their domestic equity markets first also tend to benefit, though the effect is not statistically significant.
By contrast, countries that first liberalize their capital accounts fare much worse in that growth is mostly lower after opening up compared to those that first liberalize domestic financial or equity markets, though this difference is not always statistically significant.
Finally, the findings are robust when controlling for financial crises in the model (see model (2) of Table 6 ).
The second robustness check conducted is to test for regional and country group differences.
For this purpose, two models are formulated, analogously to those of equations (4) and (5) above, only that now we are distinguishing between the effects of liberalization on growth Table 7 shows the results for the estimations of equation (9) Looking at the short-term versus long-term trade-off, all emerging market regions experienced a short-term acceleration in growth, though the effect is statistically significant only for Latin America and the acceding countries when controlling for crises, and only for the acceding countries when not controlling for such events. By contrast, in the long-run economies in Latin America and Asia experience lower growth, whereas acceding countries continue to grow significantly faster. Overall, what these results suggest is that the acceding countries do not conform to the above presented finding of a "short-run gain, long-run pain" from capital account liberalization among emerging markets. In fact, for acceding countries liberalization so far seems to have been an unconditional gain in terms of higher growth. By contrast, Asian economies seem to have benefited the least from the liberalization process. Although growth was significantly (9) in the text. Results for separate regressions for "short-term" and "long-term" "post-liberalisation" are based on equation (10).
with crisis control without crisis control
higher in the immediate aftermath of liberalization, subsequent growth was lower, which from a comparison in Table 7 seems to be mostly explained the severity of the regional financial crisis in the second half of the 1990s.
Moreover, an important qualifier of this result is that Asian economies tended to grow relatively quickly in the 1980s before financial liberalization, whereas Latin American and Eastern European economies grew little, or experienced even economic contractions in the years prior to opening up. Since the estimates given in the first panel of Table 7 show the differences in growth of being open relative to being closed, the absolute level of growth may still have been higher for Asian economies under liberalization than for e.g. Latin American countries.
One important finding of the analysis is that acceding countries so far seem to defy the intertemporal trade-off that emerging markets in Asia and Latin America experienced.
However, one important caveat is that acceding countries have liberalized only relatively recently, i.e. mostly within the last 5 to 10 years, whereas most emerging markets in Asia and
Latin America did so already in the 1980s or early 1990s. Hence it is not possible and too early to speak of a "long-run gain" for acceding countries. In particular, few acceding countries have so far suffered financial crises since their transition to market economies. This point is also underlined by the similarity of the estimates for acceding countries when controlling and when not controlling for crises. It therefore remains to be seen over the current and next decades whether acceding countries can continue to unanimously gain from the financial liberalization process by achieving higher economic growth.
Conclusions
The objective of the paper has been to analyze the financial liberalization-growth nexus from a new perspective. The paper has investigated whether capital account liberalization creates an intertemporal trade-off, i.e. whether countries experience a short-run gain at the expense of a medium-to long-run pain due to opening up their capital account. Conceptually such a trade-off can exist for different reasons. Gourinchas and Jeanne (2002) argue that financial liberalization primarily leads to a one-off gain in the short-run due to the locking in of domestic reforms. The argument by Pill (1997, 1999) states that such a tradeoff may be created by an investment and lending boom immediately after liberalization, which ultimately may turn into bust and a collapse, resulting in lower growth and possibly recession and financial crises in the medium-term.
The paper has presented evidence in favor of the existence of such a trade-off from capital account liberalization for a broad set of 45 emerging economies and industrialized countries.
The opening of the capital account led to a 1.5% higher growth during the first five years after liberalization. Growth subsequently returned to or even below its pre-liberalization rate for the overall average of the countries.
However, there are significant regional differences in that it has been in particular many
Asian and Latin American economies that have gone through such a cycle of faster short-run growth but lower medium-run growth in the 1980s and 1990s, whereas acceding countries so far have unanimously gained from financial liberalization. An important caveat is, however, that acceding countries have liberalized much more recently and have mostly not experienced severe financial crises and economic contractions as many other emerging markets did. It therefore remains to be seen whether acceding countries can continue to reap benefits from liberalization without experiencing any setbacks in terms of economic growth and in terms of their catching-up potential with industrialized countries.
The main implication of the paper is that it is important to understand this intertemporal tradeoff in order to understand why some countries gain from liberalization whereas others may experience lower and more volatile growth. It sheds light on the possible reason why the literature so far has not found a compelling link between openness and growth. The findings of the paper also suggest that there are strong non-linear relationships between openness, several economic determinants and economic growth over time. In particular, the paper has presented evidence that economic growth immediately after liberalization is often driven by an investment boom and a surge in portfolio and debt inflows, which then become detrimental to economic growth in the medium-to long-run. By contrast, the factors that lead to higher growth in the longer term tend to be the quality of domestic institutions, the size of FDI inflows and the sequencing of the liberalization process. These may be important points for policy-makers' managing of their countries' transition process and integration into the world economy.
